9.I BASIC FEATURES
9.I.1 Guyana’s sugar is produced by a state-owned enterprise,
the Guyana Sugar Corporation (GUYSUCO). Although a parastatal, the corporation
has been managed since 1990, under a management contract, by a privately owned
British Company, Booker-Tate.
9.I.2 The company’s mission statement reads as follows: "To
establish world-class standards in agricultural practices, sugar factory
efficiencies, environmental protection and the productive use of human resources
- in order to achieve sustained profitability in any foreseeable marketing
environment - so that the sugar industry can make a full contribution to the
economic, technological and social progress of Guyana."
9.I.3 The sugar sector, which is export-oriented, contributes
immensely to Guyana’s socio-economic development: 16 percent of the country’s
total GDP and 30 percent of its agricultural GDP are derived from this
commodity; it is the largest net earner of foreign exchange in the
country; and it is the biggest corporate contributor to public revenue.
Moreover, it directly employs 25,000 people or about 10 percent of Guyana’s
labour force; indirectly, it absorbs a further 10 percent of the country’s
9.I.4 Perhaps of as great importance are the services which
GUYSUCO provides to the communities in which it operates, in the areas of
education, training, health, housing, water and recreation. Indeed, distinct
sugar communities exist in Guyana, with all the characteristics of company
9.I.5 Although Guyana had produced 395,000 tonnes of sugar in
1971, output had dropped to about 130,000 tonnes by 1990. Since then, however,
production has steadily increased to over 300,000 tonnes in 1999.
9.I.6 GUYSUCO holds 164,000 acres of Guyana’s lands, all on the
crowded coastland. Indeed, it is the largest agricultural entity in the country.
On average, depending upon cultivation practices, and the disposition of land
for human settlement, services and recreation, it occupies between 90,000 and
100,000 acres. It is estimated that about 50,000 acres of GUYSUCO’s land
holdings are either lands which are not under cane, or lands which have been
9.I.7 GUYSUCO is a relatively high-cost producer of sugar. Its
cost of production was US$0.23 per pound in 1995/96 and 1996/97, and US$0.22 in
1997/98. It is estimated that in 1998/99 the production cost was also US$0.22
per pound. This compared unfavourably with the production costs of the U.S.A.,
North East Brazil, Mauritius, India, Fiji, Australia, Guatemala, and Malawi, for
9.I.8 These production costs are not evenly distributed across
Guyana. They are highest in the western regions of the country: in Wales,
Uitvlugt, LBI and Enmore - the Demerara estates; and lowest in the other four of
the eight estates which exist in Guyana: Skeldon, Albion, Rose Hall and
Blairmont. The differences in productivity between these two groups of estates
are partly due to agro-climatic conditions and, it is sometimes claimed, to
contrasting management practices.
9.I.9 Despite its comparatively high production costs, GUYSUCO
is able to sell almost all its production in Europe, the U.S.A. and in CARICOM
countries. This is because of the EU/ACP Sugar Protocol; the EU/SPS programme;
the USA sugar programme; and the Common External Tariff (CET) which CARICOM
countries apply. These various agreements and arrangements give preference to
the entry of Guyana’s sugar at prices that are usually higher than the so-called
"world-market" price, or more properly, the price of sugar in the
9.I.10 The fact that the value of the Guyana dollar has
depreciated somewhat over the years has assisted GUYSUCO in the payment of local
costs, such as salaries and wages, simply because the foreign exchange which it
earns abroad realises more Guyana dollars and stretches farther.
9.I.11 Although some of the sugar-cane that is grown in Guyana
is produced by farmers, as opposed to GUYSUCO’s estates, the country has the
lowest farmer/estate cane ratio among CARICOM sugar producers. Thus, in the crop
year 1997/98 the farmer/estate ratio in Barbados was 66:34; in Belize, and St.
Kitts and Nevis 100:0; in Jamaica 53:47; and in Trinidad and Tobago 58:42. In
Guyana, however, the farmer/estate cane ratio was 10:90, quite the reverse of
that obtaining in the other countries.
9.I.12 Cane farmers in Guyana receive a higher proportion of
the returns that are obtained from the sale of sugar than in any other country
in the Caribbean region.
9.I.13 Even though extensive repairs have been undertaken in
recent years, the eight sugar mills in Guyana are generally not only old, but
obsolescent. Moreover, the small capacity of these mills does not permit GUYSUCO
to benefit from the scale-economies that are inherent in modern mills, and that
are necessary if the industry is to become competitive.
9.I.14 Much of the old farm machinery, with which GUYSUCO
operated until the mid 1990s, has been replaced. However, the industry’s field
operations are not as modernised and mechanised as they might be.
9.II GUYSUCO’S FUTURE PLANS
9.II.1 As has been noted, sugar production in Guyana is
basically uncompetitive. In other words, were it not for the preferential
treatment which it now receives, GUYSUCO would find it difficult to survive. In
order to overcome this difficulty, GUYSUCO has formulated a plan which it
claims, if implemented, will enable it to become "an entrepreneurial, customer
driven, retail market oriented producer of top-quality sugar and associated
value-added by-products, at a cost which will enable it to compete in any
foreseeable market environment."
9.II.2 The objectives of the plan are to increase production to
435,000 tons per annum; reduce the costs of production to US 10 to 11 cents per
pound; sell to more countries in CARICOM than they now do; increase the total
volume of sugar exports to these territories; develop more regional markets; add
value to the basic output through the production of special sugars, and the
introduction of new pack sizes and packaging; establish a distillery, if this
proves feasible; build a sugar refinery; and develop an intra-Caribbean market
for refined sugar.
9.II.3 The implementation of the plan is to be phased. It
includes, however, the following elements:-
- the construction of a new 350 tch factory at Skeldon (111,000
tonnes) from an expanded cane area;
- the designation of new lands for mechanisation;
- the closure of the Rose Hall factory, and the concomitant
expansion of the Albion facilities to 415 tch (153,000 tonnes);
- the utilisation of diffusion technology at both the Skeldon
and Albion factories;
- an increase of sugar production at other factories in order
to secure another 171,000 tonnes of sugar per annum;
- the upgrading of agricultural practices, and the introduction
of new varieties; and
- the co-generation of power from both the Guyana Power and
Light Company and GUYSUCO’s own bagasse, for use in the new and expanded
9.II.4 The company asserts that, if its plan were implemented,
the benefits which would accrue to Guyana would, inter alia be as
follows: an increase in gross foreign exchange earnings to a minimum of US$145
million per year, and net earnings of US$80 million; the generation of cash
resources sufficient to pay dividends from the year 2006; a more equitable
distribution of income; and the enhancement of rural wealth through, for
example, an expansion in the utilisation of cane produced by private farmers,
and increased levels of other economic activity.
9.II.5 The plan assumes that the current preferential markets
will remain, albeit at reduced prices; that Guyana will retain its SPS/SP
allocation; that this allocation would be augmented by amounts accruing from
those CARICOM countries in which sugar production has declined and will decline
and therefore fail to meet their preferential targets; and that sugar sales from
Guyana to other CARICOM countries would increase to 80,000 tonnes. This last
assumption is based on two considerations. First, that CARICOM, at present,
imports 120,000 tonnes from outside the region; and second, that the imposition
of its Common External Tariff would enable Guyana to be more competitive in
CARICOM markets than producers from outside the regional arrangement.
9.II.6 Other measures which would be taken to improve
productivity encompass the restructuring of the administration and management
both on the estates and at the corporation’s head office; the amalgamation of
contiguous estates; the out-sourcing of a range of activities and services
wherever these prove to be cost-effective; the mechanisation of cane loading;
and the introduction of modern processing technology into existing
9.II.7 The new plan envisages, for the Skeldon expansion, the
addition of 2,120 hectares of new land at Manarabisi, and a further 6,000
hectares between Skeldon and the Canje river. Thirty percent of the production
from this increased area will be derived from cane farmers.
9.II.8 For the Albion/Rosehall consolidation, 2,476 hectares of
new land, south of the 43 Koker expansion, will be taken over. There will also
be an expansion of cane farmers' land at Blairmont. Moreover, temporarily
abandoned land in the East Demerara area will be brought back into
9.II.9 The total costs to be incurred would be US$200 million:
US$87 million for the new Skeldon operations; US$64 million for the expanded
facilities at Albion; and US$49 million for the refurbishing of other estates.
This amount excludes routine replacement expenditure and contingencies. It is
projected that these amounts would be raised from loans (US$130 million); the
company's own resources (US$40 million); and the sale of land (US$30 million).
The possible sources of the loans that are discussed in the plan are listed as
offshore borrowings denominated in Euros/US dollars to match revenue streams;
concessionary loans to meet providers' requirements; commercial-corporate
bonds/commercial paper to be issued for local borrowing; suppliers' credit; and
9.III ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS
9.III.1 Prices and Markets
9.III.1.1 The importance of the sugar industry to our country's
development, now and in the foreseeable future, cannot be over-emphasized. On
the one hand, it is evident that a strategy must be formulated which would
ensure that the sector continues to contribute, and indeed increase, its
contribution to the country's well-being. On the other hand, because many of the
factors which might influence the degree of its contribution to our economy are
beyond our control, it is imperative that we proceed in a measured manner and
not over-commit our scarce financial resources to a programme of development
that might be founded on insecure assumptions and premises. The assumptions to
which we refer are the future world price of sugar, the share of the CARICOM
market for Guyana's outputs of sugar and sugar products, and Guyana's ability to
compete in the globalised world.
9.III.1.2 All the evidence suggests that at least to the end of
the first decade of the twenty-first century, Guyana would continue to have
preferential access to the EU sugar market. In addition, if the current CARICOM
agreements hold, as we fully expect them to do, access to this sugar market is
also assured. It cannot be stressed too much, however, that what is being
emphasized here is access. To sell in these accessible markets,
Guyana's sugar export prices must be competitive.
9.III.1.3 It is submitted that it would be a somewhat futile
exercise for us to engage in calculations which would somehow indicate what will
be the future world price for sugar after the current preferential prices are
reduced. It would be an exercise in futility for three basic reasons. First, a
time horizon of ten years is too long for any meaningful forecast to be made in
regard to the price of a commodity such as sugar, simply because technologies
tend to change, there may be significant structural changes in the political
economy of the industry, and also because it only takes two to three years to
bring idle land into cultivation. Second, there is really no "world price",
because most of the world's sugar is either sold in preferential or in home
markets in which prices differ considerably, are often subsidised, and are
definitely not market prices. Third, the "residual sugar price" or the
non-preferential sugar price, has fluctuated wildly over the last decade and a
half. There is consequently no reliable trend on which to assess prices, and
even if there had been such a trend, because the residual market is only a
portion of world consumption, such a "trend" would have little validity in a
9.III.1.4 It follows, therefore, that it is not entirely
convincing to base the future of what is certainly one of the most important
industries in the country merely on forecasts of future prices (no matter who
has made these forecasts). What has to be done, in undertaking the hazardous
task of assessing the country's future competitiveness in this area, is to
examine the price structure of both GUYSUCO and competing producers, in order to
determine which producer, or which country, would have the competitive edge.
9.III.1.5 It should be emphasised that we are not suggesting
that Guyana will not be in a position successfully to compete with those
countries which already incur lower costs. What we are asserting is that GUYSUCO
can do so only if radical changes are made in its sugar cane production methods,
particularly in West Demerara; and in its sugar cane procurement practices and
the prices it pays for farmers’ cane. In addition, its management and
administration of the various sugar estates will have to be tighter and less
costly; and the productivity of its factories will have to be considerably
enhanced. Moreover, transportation and shipping costs, which comprise a
relatively large proportion of the corporation’s expenditure will have to be
considerably reduced. Furthermore, in order for GUYSUCO to improve its
competitiveness, it will have to mechanise a significant proportion of its field
9.III.1.6 The position is not one of unrelieved gloom. On the
contrary, it appears that, for several reasons, GUYSUCO is in a position to meet
these requirements for increases in productivity and, therefore, of becoming
9.III.1.7 First, the evidence suggests that if a controlled
drainage and irrigation regime is applied to the West Demerara estates, the
water content of the soils could be considerably reduced at specific periods in
the growing cycle, and, as a consequence, the sucrose content of the cane would
be significantly increased. In addition, there are methods of ripening which
also could contribute to the enhancement of the cane’s sucrose content. Indeed,
there is much evidence demonstrating the close correlation between the
application of these agronomic and chemical methods and the profitability of the
West Demerara estates.
9.III.1.8 Second, it is possible to reduce the unit cost of
cane purchased from private cane farmers, to bring it into line with the prices
paid to similar producers in other countries, by assisting them to increase
their productivity. If this were done, the total financial benefits accruing to
the farmer would be most rewarding, but GUYSUCO’s unit costs would be reduced.
In other words, it would pay to devote more resources to the training of cane
farmers in all aspects of sugar cane production.
9.III.1.9 Third, there appears to be a shortage of
administrative managerial, and technical skills on several estates. This affects
the company’s productivity and competitiveness. If steps are urgently taken to
train the required personnel, or even to hire professionals of competence,
GUYSUCO’s competitive position would be much improved.
9.III.1.10 Fourth, with the company’s plan to purchase a new
modern factory, and to amalgamate others, not only would productivity be much
improved, but the company would be able to enjoy the benefits of scale economies
that are now denied it. Moreover, the company’s energy costs, which are a not
insignificant portion of its current expenditure, would be reduced, because of
its programme to utilise bagasse in much of its future production. In addition
the new mills would be much more efficient than those which are now being
9.III.1.11 Fifth, with the improvement of the deep-water
facility in the Berbice River, shipping and transportation costs will inevitably
9.III.1.12 Sixth, GUYSUCO proposes to mechanise its loading
operations. This, too, will reduce costs.
9.III.1.13 Similar considerations apply, in large part to the
East Demerara estates, which are currently the highest cost producers within
GUYSUCO. They are high-cost producers mainly because, according to the
corporation, they utilise a high proportion of relatively poor soils, factory
capacity at Enmore and LBI is under-utilised, and management’s performance is
less than optimal. Steps should therefore be taken to bring new lands into
cultivation as far as possible, to replace the mills over time by more efficient
modern units, and to improve the effectiveness of the management.
9.III.1.14 Our own calculations indicate, when all these
factors are taken into account, that GUYSUCO would be able to reduce its
production costs to about US$0.10 per pound. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect
that there would be a market for 500,000 tonnes of sugar per year, and that
accordingly, GUYSUCO’s unit production costs would be further reduced. On
the other hand, our investigations suggest that those countries which now
produce sugar at costs that are lower than Guyana’s have in several respects,
already attained optimal efficiency. It is most unlikely therefore that they
would be able significantly to reduce costs in the future.
9.III.1.15 Moreover, Guyana possesses an additional advantage
because of its membership of CARICOM. CARICOM currently purchases 150,000 tonnes
from third countries to meet their needs. Furthermore, it appears that because
of production costs which range between US$0.40 to US$0.48 per pound, the
governments of Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Trinidad effectively subsidise
sugar production in their countries. This is most unlikely to continue. The
captive CARICOM market can therefore provide a most lucrative cushion for our
9.III.2.1 The new programmes that are planned for the
rejuvenation and expansion of the industry would require a number of personnel
in new disciplines, and an upgrading of the skills of many of those who are now
employed in GUYSUCO. Indeed, there appears to be a shortage of managerial and
technical skills in every major activity within the industry. Training will be
needed, for example, in co-generation, in the operation of the proposed
distillery, in the packaging and manufacture of special sugars, and in sugar
refining practices. Moreover, the management, administrative and negotiating
skills of GUYSUCO’s top Guyanese need to be somewhat enhanced. It will be
necessary also to train both factory and field workers in many areas which will
be innovations for most Guyanese: in the new factories, and with new types of
9.III.3.1 Land issues in Guyana are most complex. It is for
this reason that a chapter in this Strategy is specifically devoted to this
topic. However, because GUYSUCO is the largest single occupier of land on
Guyana’s coast, its land holdings and their disposition deserve special
consideration. As pointed out earlier, GUYSUCO holds 164,000 acres of the
country’s land. The average size of its eight estates is therefore approximately
20,500 acres. Albion, which occupies 28,166 acres is the largest, while Wales
with 14,232 acres is the smallest. About two-thirds of the land held by the
corporation is leased from the State, while the remaining one-third is owned by
the entity. However, because GUYSUCO is a state-owned enterprise, in reality
all the land held by the corporation is owned by the State, or by the
people of Guyana.
9.III.3.2 Much of the land which GUYSUCO now controls is prime
land. Furthermore, even the company's most expansionary plans will not require
them to utilise all of their land holdings. In contrast, the prospects of many
of the other economic and social developmental activities that are put forward
in this NDS would be greatly improved if the unutilised lands were to be taken
back by the State. This is true for housing programmes; for the development of
other types of agricultural products, including aquaculture; for the location of
industries; and for the siting of commercial activities. In addition, it has
been argued that freehold land on the coast of Guyana is remarkably high-priced,
partly because the State owns so much of it, and partly because GUYSUCO holds a
relatively large proportion which is not being beneficially occupied. Steps
should therefore urgently be taken to rationalise the use of the land now
held by GUYSUCO before it proceeds with its plans. For, as has
been pointed out, it intends to sell a significant amount of land for commercial
uses in order to raise money to implement its future programmes. It must not be
allowed to do so, on its own terms. In other words, it must raise the short-fall
of US$30 million, that would be occasioned if it is not permitted to sell the
nation’s land, from commercial loans or other sources.
9.III.4 Employment Costs
9.III.4.1 Employment costs (including incentives and
non-pecuniary worker benefits) account for over sixty percent of the cost of
producing a tonne of sugar in Guyana. It is evident that the company intends
further to reduce its labour force in order to curtail employment costs,
particularly as it would be impossible and undesirable to reduce the package of
incentives now earned by the workers. This almost inevitable reduction in the
labour force is obviously a factor to be taken into account in the formulation
of a national development strategy.
9.III.5 Cane Farmers
9.III.5.1 Private cane farmers produce cane at a higher cost
than the estates, primarily because their yields are lower and the quality of
their cane inferior. These defects in the product are in turn due to ineffective
drainage and irrigation systems, the relatively primitive nature of the
technology that is applied, and the inadequacy of their farming practices. In
addition, the co-operatives and private groups which grow sugar cane, tend to be
disorganised. Nevertheless, it is desirable, for social reasons, and, as we have
seen, ultimately for financial reasons, that private cane farming outputs be
increased significantly above their current low level. Accordingly, the
inefficiencies that are inherent in the system will have to be rectified.
9.III.5.2 The present procedures for establishing cane prices
are cumbersome and, more important, do not appear to be either equitable or to
be designed to improve efficiency. There are two determining aspects of the
present price structure for farmers’ cane: the method whereby the conversion
factor from cane to sugar is derived; and the proportionate distribution of the
net income from this sugar between the farmer and the processor. Both of these
matters are dealt with in the National Cane Farming Committee Act, No. 29 of
1975 (as amended) which establishes that the so-called Puerto-Rican formula be
employed to calculate the cane to sugar ratio. The appropriateness and accuracy
of this formula have been fiercely challenged by Guyanese cane farmers, and by
specialists in this area. Indeed it is now generally acknowledged that the
Jamaican Recovery Cane Sugar formula is more accurate and equitable. There is
obviously, therefore, a need to revisit this very crucial matter.
9.III.5.3 There are also problems in respect of the share of
proceeds. It appears that cane farmers in Guyana are paid more than most similar
farmers in other parts of the world. In the face of this, GUYSUCO seems
reluctant significantly to expand their dependence on cane farmers. However, the
returns to cane farmers are directly linked to the future of the company, be it
through favourable sugar prices or efficient factory recoveries. It is evident,
therefore, that the entire cane farming structure, from the organisation of
farmers, the provision of inputs and extension services, to the methods of
calculating both sucrose content and prices, be rationalised.
9.III.6 Transportation Costs
9.III.6.1 As has been emphasised elsewhere in this National
Development Strategy, transportation costs for Guyana’s exports are generally
higher than in most other countries. This is especially true for sugar. If we
are going to be competitive we will have to remove those constraints over which
we have some control: the absence of an adequate deep-water harbour, the dearth
of bulk loading facilities, and the inadequacy of our current port
9.IV SECTORAL OBJECTIVE
9.IV.1 The objective of the sector is to improve the
competitiveness of the industry so that it may increase its contribution to the
development of Guyana.
9.V THE STRATEGY
9.V.1 The overall strategy will be (i) to utilise the most
productive soils that are available within those agro-climatic areas which would
yield the highest amounts of sugar at the lowest possible costs; (ii) to
increase the productivity of the Demerara sugar estates by adopting more
effective agronomic practices; (iii) to improve the quality of the milling
process, through the establishment of new mills and the amalgamation of others;
and (iv) to add value to the sugar cane raw-material through the expansion and
deepening of the manufacturing process, the widening of the range of sugar based
products that are produced, and the enhanced packaging of these products.
9.V.2 Between 2001 and 2005 a detailed plan for the
diversification of economic activity in those areas in which the Demerara
estates are located will be formulated and implemented.
9.V.3 This plan will include the establishment of special
micro-credit facilities the provision of training in various disciplines,
trades, crafts and entrepreneurship; and the provision of land for cultivation,
housing, and business development on favourable terms. In other words, a
comprehensive land settlement and land redistribution plan will be implemented.
9.V.4 At least two housing schemes, one in Western Demerara
and the other in Eastern Demerara will be established. The measures and
incentives described elsewhere in this NDS, particularly in the Chapter devoted
to Housing, will apply.
9.V.5 The inhabitants of those areas will be encouraged
specifically to engage in the cultivation of high-value non-traditional crops,
aquaculture, and to establish specific micro-industries. They will be provided
with relevant technical assistance and extension services.
9.V.6 The important point is to ensure that undue reliance
is not placed solely on sugar in these districts, and that there would be
available other suitable options for employment.
9.V.7 Although the main thrust of the sugar expansion programme
would be in Berbice, i.e. Skeldon, Blairmont, Rosehall and Albion, where
GUYSUCO’S plans for the extension of both milling and field capacity will be
concentrated, sugar production in the Demerara estates will be made more
competitive and, at the same time, an enabling environment for the creation of
alternative development will be provided.
9.V.8 GUYSUCO’s overall production capacity will be increased
to 500,000 tonnes of sugar per year.
9.V.9 Almost immediately, steps will be taken for all
the land now occupied by GUYSUCO to revert to the State. The State will then
lease to GUYSUCO, at normal rates, the land which it requires for current and
future planned expansion.
9.V.10 After consultation with representatives of the cane
farmers, the National Cane Farming Act will be revised in order to make it more
equitable, to increase the involvement of a greater number of cane farmers in
the production of cane for GUYSUCO, to reduce production costs, and to make
Guyana’s cane more competitive.
9.V.11 New contracts, which will endeavour to be fair both to
the cane farmers and GUYSUCO, will be negotiated.
9.V.12 Cane farmers will be provided with land to enable them
to produce more cane.
9.V.13 Cane farmers will be trained in a range of agronomic
skills to improve their performance. In addition, essential inputs and extension
services will be provided to enable them to increase their productivity
9.V.14 Efforts will be made to involve the workers of the
industry, the citizens of Guyana, the Government of Guyana and the company which
now manages GUYSUCO in the ownership and control of the industry. To this end,
twenty percent of the shares will be offered to Booker Tate as a strategic
partner, 20 percent to the employees of the industry, 20 percent to the citizens
of Guyana, and 20 percent will be retained by the Government. The remaining 20
percent will be offered to the world at large.
9.V.15 A "claw-back" clause will be inserted into the
agreement, in order to ensure that at least for a period of ten years after
privatisation, sugar will be produced by the Company in order that the social
and economic structures that are attendant on the continuation of the industry
are not unduly disrupted and jeopardised.
9.V.16 It is important that Booker Tate agree to purchase
shares in the recapitalised company, not only because they appear to possess
better leverage powers in the international markets, but also because their
purchase of these shares would provide evidence of their financial faith in the
industry, and in the development plans which they have assisted in
9.V.17 The financial resources that are required to implement
GUYSUCO’s plans for the future will be raised though a consortium, put together
by a lead banker, who will obtain the required amounts on the international
9.V.18 Intensive training courses will be mounted for all
levels of the company’s employees, in order to prepare them for the expansion
and modernisation of the industry.
9.V.19 The Jamaican Recoverable Cane Sugar Formula, rather than
the Puerto-Rican, will be employed in determining the sugar content of the sugar
cane supplied by farmers to the estates.
9.V.20 Because of the importance of the CARICOM market to the
survival of Guyana’s sugar industry, special efforts will be made by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade to ensure that the terms of the Common
External Tariff are honoured by all CARICOM members.
9.V.21 All import duties and consumption taxes will be waived
for a period of five years, as for other industries.
9.V.22 The sugar levy will be abolished.
9.V.23 Mechanical loading procedures will be introduced. The
possibility of engaging in mechanical harvesting, particularly in the new
planting areas, will be seriously examined.